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ll consumers of prescription drugs serve as guinea pigs for the 
pharmaceutical industry, for every new drug remains basically 
‘experimental’ even after it has been approved for general use.”1  
Although this assessment of the regulatory environment for approved 
prescription drugs may seem harsh, the friends and family of the 
nearly 28,000 consumers who likely died as a result of the 
postapproval regulation of Vioxx2—or lack thereof—would probably 
tend to agree.  But should the system be changed to prevent future 
breakdowns in the monitoring of drug safety?  If so, what are the 
proper roles for state and federal governmental actors, namely state 
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attorneys general and federal agencies?  The answers to these 
questions directly or indirectly impact the lives and health of all 
Americans. 
Sales in the pharmaceutical industry are a direct result of the 
confidence of consumers and physicians in prescription drug 
regulation.  The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) plays a 
crucial role in the prescription drug marketplace by ensuring that the 
trust shared by consumers and physicians is well founded.3  This 
public and professional trust in prescription drugs arises, in large part, 
from both groups’ confidence in the effectiveness and integrity of the 
FDA when performing its two primary functions: drug approval and 
postapproval drug-safety monitoring.4 
The FDA, however, faces increasing skepticism in the public arena 
regarding its ability to effectively regulate approved drugs that have 
entered the market.  According to a recent study, over half of 
American adults believe the FDA does a fair or poor job ensuring the 
safety of new prescription drugs.5  The same study found that 61% of 
American adults thought the FDA’s safeguarding function was the 
most important area on which the agency should focus its energy.6 
The negative attitude toward the FDA’s efforts may be attributed to 
some aspects of the structure and implementation of regulation 
policies.  The structure of both postapproval surveillance of 
prescription drugs and the decision-making processes that utilize the 
information collected from that surveillance suffer from numerous 
inefficiencies that serve to undermine the FDA’s safeguarding 
 
3 Phil B. Fontanarosa et al., Postmarketing Surveillance—Lack of Vigilance, Lack of 
Trust, 292 JAMA 2647, 2647 (2004). 
4 Id.  The FDA’s effort in these two areas leads to consumer and physician expectations 
that correctly prescribed drugs “generally will have beneficial effects and will not cause 
significant harm.”  Id. 
5 See Harris Interactive, Confidence in FDA Hits New Low, According to 
WJS.com/Harris Interactive Study, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Apr. 23, 2008, at 2, available at 
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/news/newsletters/wsjhealthnews/HI_WSJ_HealthCare 
Poll_2008_v07_i05.pdf.  The survey found that 58% of people polled had negative views 
toward the FDA’s performance of its safeguarding function.  Id.  These results differ 
markedly from those revealed in a survey conducted in 2004: 56% of the people polled in 
that survey had positive beliefs about the FDA when asked identical survey questions.  Id.  
Over 50% of the subjects in the 2008 study answered negatively in response to questions 
about their opinions regarding the following major functions of the FDA: ensuring that 
new prescription drugs are promptly available to the public, safeguarding the safety of 
prescription drugs produced outside of the United States, and administering the recall of 
prescription drugs when safety issues occur.  Id. 
6 See id. 
 2009] These Statements Have Not Been Approved by the FDA 1191 
mission.  One such inefficiency stems from the fact that 
pharmaceutical companies—and not the FDA—are largely 
responsible for conducting postapproval safety trials of prescription 
drugs.7  Although this responsibility alone arouses suspicion, the 
company sponsoring the clinical trial also controls the reporting of the 
resulting data.8  Until recently, a pharmaceutical company had an 
unprecedented ability to conceal the unfavorable results of these 
safety studies without the FDA knowing it was doing so.9  Because of 
the limited information the FDA receives from the sponsoring 
companies, the agency normally only has access to safety information 
from physicians and other professionals in the health care industry 
who voluntarily report adverse events caused by the use of a 
prescription drug.10  As discussed below, voluntary reporting is 
fraught with deficiencies in the collection and communication of 
adverse event information. 
Even in the unusual situation where the FDA has accurate safety 
and efficacy information about a prescription drug, problems and 
inefficiencies within the agency may still serve to hamper effective 
regulatory decisions.11  For example, the FDA’s safety decisions 
regarding the painkilling drug Vioxx allegedly involved interpretation 
inconsistencies between agency officials.  Research by an FDA staff 
member suggested serious cardiovascular risks were associated with 
the use of the Merck drug.12  The researcher’s supervisors allegedly 
 
7 Fontanarosa et al., supra note 3, at 2647. 
8 Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, § 
801(a)(2), 121 Stat. 823, 905. 
9 See id. § 801(j)(2)(C).  Under this law, the pharmaceutical company is obligated to 
report information about various aspects of the nature of any clinical trials the company 
undertakes.  This data include basic information about the methodology of the study and 
the subsequent results.  Id. § 801(j)(3)(D)(iii). 
10 Fontanarosa et al., supra note 3, at 2647. 
11 This lack of effective regulatory decisions is not limited to prescription drugs.  The 
FDA has recently advised consumers to discontinue using fourteen Hydroxycut products, 
which are widely used, over-the-counter dietary supplements for weight loss.  Saundra 
Young, Stop Using Hydroxycut Products, FDA Says, CNN.COM, May 1, 2009, available 
at http://www.cnn.com/2009/HEALTH/05/01/hydroxycut.fda.recall/index.html.  While the 
FDA was commended by commentators and analysts for issuing such a warning based on 
reports the agency received revealing links between use of the supplements and liver 
damage, serious incidents of liver damage had already occurred as early as 2002.  Id.  
(“The reports include the 2007 death of a 19-year-old man living in the Southwest, which 
was reported to the FDA in March [2002].”).  This delay in the reporting of incidents and 
corresponding determinations must be significantly shortened. 
12 Anna Wilde Mathews, FDA Officials Tried to Tone Down Report on Vioxx, WALL 
ST. J., Oct. 8, 2004, at B2. 
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felt these risks were not as serious as their subordinate contended.13  
Yet soon after this interoffice inconsistency, Merck voluntarily pulled 
the drug off the market due to significant cardiovascular risks 
associated with its use, which were similar to those proposed by the 
staff member.14  This Vioxx incident led Senate Finance Committee 
Chairman Charles E. Grassley to investigate why “[i]nstead of acting 
as a public watchdog, the Food and Drug Administration was busy 
challenging its own expert.”15  The FDA has a history of similarly 
questionable interpretations of probative evidence regarding a 
product’s safety for use in the market.16 
Further, the pharmaceutical industry may exert significant 
influence over the determinations of the FDA, especially during the 
drug approval process.  The FDA hires panels of experts to advise the 
agency about whether a drug should be approved for introduction into 
the market for consumers and about other questions generated by the 
FDA related to this primary inquiry.17  Federal law enumerates 
various conditions that must be satisfied when selecting the experts 
that will serve on such an advisory panel.18  The law mandates “[n]o 
member of a panel may vote on any matter where the member . . . 
could gain financially from the advice given to the Secretary.”19  The 
agency does have the ability to waive this requirement so long as the 
public is notified of the conflict of interest.20  However, in the period 
between January 1, 1998, and June 30, 1999, alone, 92% of all FDA 
 
13 Id. 
14 Alice Dembner, Maker Takes Vioxx off Market, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 1, 2004, 
available at http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2004/10/01/maker_takes_vioxx 
_off_market/.  A Merck-sponsored study found Vioxx doubled the risk of stroke and heart 
attack in certain situations as compared to placebo.  Id. 
15 Mathews, supra note 12, at B2. 
16 See, e.g., Liz Szabo, FDA Ignored Evidence when Calling BPA Safe, USA TODAY, 
Oct. 29, 2008, available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/science/2008-10-28-bpa            
-fda_N.htm.  The FDA advised consumers that bisphenol A, or “BPA,” was safe for use in 
various products used by consumers, including baby bottles.  Id.  Analysis by researchers 
skeptical of this advice concluded that BPA was potentially harmful to children at one-
tenth of the amount considered safe when used in the manufacture of baby bottles.  Id. 
17 21 U.S.C. § 355(n)(1) (2006). 
18 21 U.S.C. § 355(n)(3).  These conditions mostly speak to the qualifications of the 
members of an advisory panel, including both fields of expertise and experience with 
specialties in the disease the proposed drug will be indicated to treat. 
19 21 U.S.C. § 355(n)(4). 
20 Id. 
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expert panel meetings had at least one expert with a financial conflict 
of interest.21 
Relatedly, pharmaceutical companies have shown the capacity to 
not only influence FDA evaluations by indirectly influencing the 
experts on the panel, but they may also voice an opinion regarding 
who should be excluded from the panel.  The exclusion of a noted 
cardiologist from an expert panel evaluating a blood-thinning drug in 
2009 is a telling example demonstrating this influence.22  Dr. Sanjay 
Kaul had a history of criticizing Eli Lilly’s clinical trials for the blood 
thinner under consideration.23  Presumably for this reason, Eli Lilly 
informed the FDA that Dr. Kaul had an “intellectual bias” and should 
be excluded from the advisory panel.24  The FDA followed Eli Lilly’s 
advice, and the remaining experts on the panel, not surprisingly, 
unanimously approved the drug.25  Dr. Janet Woodcock, the director 
of the drug division within the FDA, stated, “[a]t every step of the 
way errors were made by multiple parties not following the correct 
way of doing things, and that led to Dr. Kaul being disinvited from 
the advisory committee meeting.”26  Eli Lilly effectively influenced 
the regulatory efforts of the FDA by preventing the presence of a 
voice that was likely to be negative toward its proposed prescription 
drug. 
In light of the current regulatory climate, this Comment argues for 
a new approach to the regulation of prescription drugs approved by 
the FDA for general sale.  The author proposes a reorganization of the 
agency resulting in the creation of a division of the FDA that focuses 
solely on actively making regulatory decisions regarding postapproval 
pharmaceutical products.  This new division should be granted the 
power to effectively gather information and enforce regulations 
against pharmaceutical companies without needing to consult with 
 
21 Dennis Cauchon, FDA Advisers Tied to Industry, USA TODAY, Sept. 25, 2000, at 1A, 
available at http://www.internetwks.com/pauling/fdaconflict.html.  Surprisingly, these 
conflicts occasionally involved experts who would assist a pharmaceutical company in the 
development of a drug and then serve on the expert advisory panel assembled by the FDA 
to evaluate the drug for approval.  Id.  This dual service has the potential to materially 
undermine the FDA’s analysis for obvious reasons, including inherent conflicts of interest. 
22 Matthew Perrone, FDA Admits Error in Barring Doctor from Panel, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS, Feb. 24, 2009, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/ 
2009/02/24/financial/f103042S33.DTL&feed=rss.business. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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another agency or FDA division.  The use of this power by a new 
division would significantly ameliorate much of the public distrust 
discussed previously. 
Part I of this Comment focuses on the authority and obligations of 
the FDA under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) as 
that law pertains to the regulation of prescription drugs in two 
regards: the period of time prior to the FDA’s approval allowing the 
drug to enter the market, or preapproval, and the period of time after 
this approval occurs, postapproval.  This Part highlights the 
shortcomings of the current postapproval regulatory environment, 
which originate in the FDCA but also stem from the methods used to 
implement this law. 
Part II examines the regulatory scheme that has developed in the 
absence of strong regulation by the U.S. government.  Without strong 
federal regulation, state attorneys general have turned to unique and 
innovative legal enforcement efforts to ensure the trust of patients and 
physicians in their respective states in the safety of the prescription 
drugs sold there. 
Based on the void in the current federal regulatory landscape, the 
author proposes a systematic solution for remedying the current, 
crucial FDA deficiencies in Part III.  The FDA must be granted the 
power and tools to more effectively and accurately analyze and react 
to drug safety data.  The FDA must become more specialized, and 
thus efficient, by dividing the monitoring of prescription drugs along 
logical lines—between preapproval and postapproval regulation.  This 
division of labor exists to some extent in the current scheme, but the 
power to make decisions based on emerging safety data must be fully 
vested in the proper subdivision of the agency.  By enacting this 
solution, the federal government will create a system of postapproval 
drug regulation that will restore the American public’s trust in the 
safety of the products that impact the most important possession of a 
constituent: mortality. 
I 
REGULATORY OBLIGATIONS OF PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES 
A.  New Drug Applications 
Under the FDCA, a pharmaceutical company must receive 
permission from the FDA before it can market a drug in the United 
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States.27  Specifically, the FDCA prescribes that “[n]o person shall 
introduce or deliver for introduction into interstate commerce any 
new drug, unless an approval of an application . . . is effective with 
respect to such drug.”28  The pharmaceutical company sponsoring the 
drug must provide the FDA with information, typically gathered 
through extensive clinical testing, regarding the drug’s efficacy and 
safety for its proposed uses.29  The FDA must then receive a new 
drug application (NDA) from the sponsor outlining whether the 
clinical tests show the “drug is safe for use and whether such drug is 
effective in use.”30  The composite documents included in an NDA 
should provide a full report of any clinical tests undertaken, a report 
on the results of any animal testing, and an overview explaining how 
the prescription drug behaves in the body.31 
During the NDA process, the FDA also requires the sponsor 
company to provide a proposal for the prescription drug’s labeling, 
which should allow the agency to fully assess the effectiveness of the 
label.32  The FDA will then sanction the proposed labeling for the 
drug if the labeling adequately indicates the approved uses, the 
approved population, the appropriate warnings, and other important 
information about the drug that the agency concludes should be 
available to the general public.33 
The clinical studies used in the NDA application are controlled by 
the sponsor and tend to engage a few thousand subjects over a short 
period of time.34  Based on their scope, these clinical studies are 
fundamentally incapable of adequately reflecting the likely safety 
issues that inevitably arise when the appropriate population in the 
 
27 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2006). 
28 Id. 
29 21 C.F.R. § 312.23 (2009). 
30 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(A). 
31 See U.S. Food & Drug Admin., New Drug Application (NDA), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedand 
Approved/ApprovalApplications/NewDrugApplicationNDA/default.htm (last visited Mar. 
9, 2010). 
32 David A. Kessler & David C. Vladeck, A Critical Examination of the FDA’s Efforts 
to Preempt Failure-to-Warn Claims, 96 GEO. L.J. 461, 470 (2008). 
33 Ralph F. Hall & Elizabeth S. Sobotka, Inconsistent Government Policies: Why FDA 
Off-Label Regulation Cannot Survive First Amendment Review Under Greater New 
Orleans, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 1, 4 (2007). 
34 Charles Steenburg, The Food and Drug Administration’s Use of Postmarketing 
(Phase IV) Study Requirements: Exception to the Rule?, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 295, 297 
(2006). 
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general public uses the drug, which could be a staggering number of 
patients.  In 1964, then-FDA Commissioner George P. Larrick 
informed a subcommittee of the House Committee on Government 
Operations that the best “clinical investigation will reveal only a 
fraction of the information that emerges during the course of a drug’s 
general marketing and use.”35  This sentiment is echoed by another 
expert on the matter, William Schultz, who stated that these 
preapproval investigations 
can detect drug-related injuries that occur at a rate of between one 
in 500 and one in 1,000.  Yet, if the drug is used by 200,000 people 
. . . a serious adverse event appearing in as few as one in 10,000 
people is very significant, since it would occur 20 times.  These rare 
reactions can be identified only after a drug has been widely used.36 
 Further, preapproval clinical tests are unable to detect serious 
adverse events that occur in a subpopulation not represented in the 
study (the elderly, for example) and that occur only after use for a 
long period of time or, more likely, that occur somewhat 
infrequently.37  Nonetheless, the FDA’s safety and efficacy 
evaluation of a new drug is based largely, if not entirely, on the 
information garnered by those clinical trials.  Therefore, the FDA’s 
approval should not be considered a guarantee that the drug is safe for 
use.38  For example, one study involving “biologicals,” drugs with an 
active substance produced by a biological source, in the United States 
and the European Union found that 23.6% of the drugs studied were 
subject to safety-related postapproval regulations, including 
 
35 Id. 
36 William B. Schultz, How to Improve Drug Safety, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 2004, at 
A35, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A26865-2004Dec1 
.html. 
37 Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 32, at 471. 
38 See Gregory D. Curfman et al., Why Doctors Should Worry About Preemption, 359 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1, 2 (2008) (showing the safety issues that evolved for four prescription 
drugs that were on the market between a year and a half and fifteen years; two of these 
drugs were removed from the market altogether).  Interestingly, in the case of medical 
devices, the U.S. Supreme Court recently decided that FDA approval precluded suit by 
patients against manufacturers.  Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1009 (2008).  
This ruling places a new strain on the FDA’s resources because the FDA’s approval of a 
device must effectively ensure the device’s safety without the continuous scrutiny of 
private litigation.  Stuart O. Schweitzer, Trying Times at the FDA—The Challenge of 
Ensuring the Safety of Imported Pharmaceuticals, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1773, 1773, 
1776 (2008). 
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withdrawals from the market.39  The limited scope of preapproval 
clinical trials creates an accentuated need for postapproval 
surveillance of prescription drugs that adequately safeguards the 
general public from unknown safety risks. 
The preapproval process is unlikely to be significantly altered due 
to concerns that a more thorough process would result in serious 
health risks to the subjects of the trials.  Prior to approval, 
pharmaceutical companies must conduct various “Phase” trials—
clinical trials with increasing breadth and length to prove the overall 
risk-benefit of the drug.  The purpose of Phase I trials is to determine 
basically how the drug will interact with human subjects.40  Phase II 
trials involve a larger number of subjects that are suffering from the 
disease or condition for which the drug will be potentially approved 
to remedy.41  The final preapproval clinical trial is a Phase III study, 
which involves a larger number of subjects and is utilized to obtain 
more definite evidence of the overall risk-benefit profile of the drug.42   
Historically, critics of the current drug approval process argued 
that Phase IV trials—larger, postapproval clinical trials carried out by 
the sponsor—could serve an important function as an alternative to 
the traditional NDA process for the approval of life-saving drugs.43  
These critics were interested in both the speedy approval of drugs and 
the avoidance of any ethical dilemma arising from the untimely 
withholding of this important type of drug.  In 2005, the FDA 
required approximately 57% of NDA sponsors to conduct some type 
of Phase IV trial after approval.44  As discussed later, these 
obligations are rarely fulfilled as the FDA’s current organization 
undermines effective enforcement and monitoring of the trials.  When 
used in conjunction with the passive gathering of safety information 
from health professionals and consumers, the use of Phase IV trials is 
one of the most effective means of analyzing larger safety risks in the 
general population of drug users. 
 
39 Thijs Giezen et al., Safety-Related Regulatory Actions for Biologicals Approved in 
the United States and the European Union, 300 JAMA 1887, 1887 (2008).  The 
biologicals in this study were approved between January 1995 and June 2007.  Id. 
40 ClinicalTrials.gov, U.S. Nat’l Insts. of Health, Glossary of Clinical Trials Terms, 
http://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/info/glossary (last visited Mar. 9, 2010). 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 See Steenburg, supra note 34, at 319–20. 
44 Id. at 325.  This conclusion results from an informal analysis of the NDAs filed in 
2005.  Id. at 325 n.319. 
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B.  Postapproval Surveillance 
Pharmaceutical companies are under a variety of obligations after a 
prescription drug receives approval by the FDA to enter the market.  
As discussed above, a full understanding of a drug’s safety profile is 
almost impossible to establish based on the limited number of 
selected participants in the clinical trials used to support the FDA’s 
decision to approve a new drug.45  A complete understanding only 
becomes apparent as the general populace, without any selection 
process, uses the drug.46 
Understandably, federal law requires manufacturers of approved 
drugs to maintain all records of data and information relating to the 
drug’s safety once it is introduced into the market.47  This information 
should be sufficiently complete to allow the FDA, after reviewing it, 
to immediately suspend the drug’s sale if the data show that the drug 
is an “imminent hazard to public health.”48  Essentially, the 
pharmaceutical company has an obligation under federal law to relay 
any information about adverse events reported to the company by 
physicians and others involved with the prescription drug to the 
FDA.49  In the case of reports of serious and unexpected adverse 
events arising from the use of the particular drug, the company must 
forward the information to the FDA within fifteen days of initial 
receipt.50  After forwarding, the pharmaceutical manufacturer must 
 
45 See Catherine D. DeAngelis & Phil B. Fontanarosa, Prescription Drugs, Products 
Liability, and Preemption of Tort Litigation, 300 JAMA 1939, 1939 (2008). 
46 Id.  This may not necessarily be the case for certain drugs with specialized 
indications.  For example, certain prescription birth control drugs will only be used by a 
specialized segment of the population: younger women.  In these situations, clinical trials 
prior to approval may be significantly more accurate in predicting the safety of the drug as 
the affected population is more particular and thus easier to generalize. 
47 21 U.S.C. § 355(k)(1) (2006). 
48 21 U.S.C. § 355(e), (k)(1). 
49 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(c) (2009).  An adverse event is not defined expressly in the 
federal regulations. 
50 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(c)(1)(i).  The commonly used definition is: 
any untoward medical occurrence in a patient or clinical investigation subject 
administered a pharmaceutical product . . . . An AE can therefore be any 
unfavorable and unintended sign (including an abnormal laboratory finding), 
symptom, or disease temporally associated with the use of a medicinal 
(investigational) product, whether or not related to the medicinal (investigational) 
product . . . . 
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. ET AL., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY E6 GOOD 
CLINICAL PRACTICE: CONSOLIDATED GUIDANCE 2 (1996), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/regulatoryinformation/guidances/UCM129515.pdf. 
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then conduct further investigations into the nature and circumstances 
of the adverse event—the results of which must be subsequently 
forwarded to the FDA within fifteen days.51  Less serious adverse 
reactions must be reported to the FDA either quarterly or annually 
depending on the length of time the prescription drug has been on the 
market.52  The pharmaceutical company is also required to provide 
the FDA with an annual report summarizing new information about 
the drug’s efficacy, safety, and labeling from the previous year, 
including an explanation of the actions the company will be taking as 
a result.53 
These obligations seem stringent, but two distinct inadequacies 
prevent this passive reporting from being truly effective in practice, 
namely an inefficient and underfunded process and a general lack of 
reporting of adverse events by companies.  Tellingly, a study by the 
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that the “FDA 
lacks a clear and effective process for making decisions about, and 
providing management oversight of, postmarket drug safety issues.”54  
Although the FDA is responsible for ensuring the safety of a 
collection of products that accounts for approximately twenty percent 
of total consumer spending,55 the FDA’s budget in 2005 was less than 
1/50 the budget of the U.S. Department of Agriculture.56  Also, 
pharmaceutical companies have no independent obligation to 
establish a system that will track adverse events or otherwise improve 
their efforts to gather adverse event data.57 
In 2002, U.S. Representative Henry Waxman stated “the FDA 
estimates that it hears of less than 1 percent of serious adverse 
reactions.”58  This lack of reporting likely stems from the practical 
problems facing physicians and others who attempt to report, 
including the inherent difficulty in determining if the adverse event 
 
51 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(c)(1)(ii). 
52 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(c)(2). 
53 21 C.F.R. § 314.81(b)(2)(i). 
54 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-402, DRUG SAFETY: IMPROVEMENT 
NEEDED IN FDA’S POSTMARKET DECISION-MAKING AND OVERSIGHT PROCESS 5 (2006), 
available at http://gao.gov/new.items/d06402.pdf. 
55 Eve E. Slater, Today’s FDA, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 293, 293 (2005). 
56 Id. at 294.  The FDA also employed a tenth the workforce of the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture.  Id. 
57 Steenburg, supra note 34, at 298. 
58 Reauthorization of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong. 49 (2002) 
(statement of Rep. Henry Waxman). 
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occurred because of the use of the prescription drug or if the event is 
merely a symptom of the infliction or illness that the patient is 
suffering.  Also, the adverse event may be so common in the general 
populace that physicians may not feel compelled to report it to the 
drug’s manufacturer.59  For example, Merck withdrew Vioxx from 
the market after a clinical trial revealed a significantly increased risk 
of heart attacks resulting from the use of the drug when compared to a 
placebo.60  Because heart attacks are such a common occurrence in 
the general public, physicians did not see the link before the study 
between the increase in the occurrence of heart attacks in Vioxx users 
and their use of the pain medication.61  For those reasons, the 
inefficient process and the spontaneous and voluntary reporting used 
in postapproval regulation have proved insufficient to adequately 
protect the public. 
Another important focus of the FDA in postmarket drug regulation 
is the regulation of modifications to a drug’s labeling.  Federal law 
requires pharmaceutical companies to seek approval of most proposed 
label changes for a prescription drug, including major labeling 
changes relating to a drug’s safety.62  But there are a variety of 
changes that may be made without the FDA’s prior authorization to 
allow the company to quickly provide the most current safety 
information to physicians who prescribe and patients who use the 
drug.63  No prior authorization is needed for changes 
[t]o add or strengthen a contraindication, warning, precaution, or 
adverse reaction [for which there is the evidence of a causal 
association]; . . . [t]o add or strengthen a statement about drug 
abuse, dependence, psychological effect, or overdosage; . . . [t]o add 
or strengthen an instruction about dosage and administration that is 
intended to increase the safe use of the drug product; . . . [and t]o 
delete false, misleading, or unsupported indications for use or 
claims for effectiveness . . . .64 
In fact, federal law requires pharmaceutical companies to report 
changes to the labeling of a prescription drug that reflect significant 
hazards once a reasonable causal connection between the hazard and 
 
59 Steenburg, supra note 34, at 299. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(b)(2)(v) (2009). 
63 Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 32, at 472–73. 
64 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A)–(D). 
 2009] These Statements Have Not Been Approved by the FDA 1201 
the drug has been established.65  But, as discussed more fully below, 
this regulation has also proved ineffective, and, thus, the impetus for 
label changes normally comes from other enforcement actors. 
II 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS OF THE STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL 
(OUTSIDE OF THE FDA’S PURVIEW) 
The void created by ineffective federal surveillance of prescription 
drugs after approval has been filled by the novel enforcement actions 
of various state attorneys general.66  Over the last decade, the 
litigation efforts of state attorneys general against product 
manufacturers have dramatically altered the regulatory landscape in 
many industries.67  This dramatic change is the result of a peculiar 
characteristic of lawsuits brought by the state attorneys general, which 
is particularly prevalent when multiple states join together in such 
suits.68  This characteristic is the elevated risk to the future vitality of 
the business should the litigation proceed to a negative result.  Few 
defendant manufacturers could possibly risk allowing the lawsuits 
brought by the state attorneys general to go to trial.69  Unlike actions 
brought by private, individual plaintiffs, the possible damages 
resulting from a loss in these trials could be crippling for the 
manufacturer because the alleged harm will have been suffered by 
millions of each state’s residents.70  Further, class action lawsuits 
brought by private plaintiffs would inevitably follow a successful 
state litigation, utilizing the former action’s groundwork. 
Rather than chance huge damages payouts and considerable 
adverse publicity, manufacturers acquiesce to the often-overwhelming 
compulsion to settle with the state attorneys general.  More 
importantly for our purposes, these actions, and their subsequent 
settlement agreements, often go beyond merely addressing damages 
and enforcing current regulations by effectively imposing new 
 
65 See 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(c)(2)(i). 
66 MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY, MERCK SETTLES VIOXX LITIGATION WITH STATE 
ATTORNEYS GENERAL: AN ANALYSIS 2 (2008), available at http://www.mwe.com/info/ 
news/wp0508a.pdf. 
67 Donald G. Gifford, Impersonating the Legislature: State Attorneys General and 
Parens Patriae Product Litigation, 49 B.C. L. REV. 913, 914 (2008). 
68 See id. at 915. 
69 Id. at 916. 
70 Id.; see also In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(discussing similar class action lawsuits as eventually coercing “blackmail settlements”). 
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“regulatory-like” controls and requirements on companies regarding 
future practices and products.71  For example, as discussed further 
below, the settlement agreement between Merck and the state 
attorneys general in the Vioxx litigation required the company to 
make additional reports to the FDA regarding advertising campaigns 
that were not required by the federal regulations then in effect.72  
Prior to discussing the current situation involving pharmaceutical 
regulation, a brief analysis of the evolution of the efforts of state 
attorneys general in other industries must be considered to provide 
context. 
A.  The Foundation of State Attorney General Regulation: Tobacco 
Lawsuits 
On May 23, 1994, Mississippi Attorney General Mike Moore filed 
a complaint against several major tobacco companies alleging that the 
companies harmed the state by causing its citizens to incur tobacco-
caused illnesses.73  His argument for recovery was based on the 
allegation that the state incurred substantial costs providing an 
increased amount of health care to tobacco users while the tobacco 
companies profited from their harmful conduct.74  Additionally, the 
companies actively prevented the discovery of this harm, specifically 
the relationship between tobacco use and certain ailments, by 
violating a promise to provide independent scientific data about the 
effects of smoking to the citizens of Mississippi.75  The data the 
companies did provide effectively covered up the results of studies 
proving the detrimental effects of smoking.76  Moore argued that the 
companies’ conduct, especially the fabricated study results, violated 
Mississippi’s laws against unfair and deceptive practices as well as 
 
71 Deborah R. Hensler, The New Social Policy Torts: Litigation as a Legislative 
Strategy Some Preliminary Thoughts on a New Research Project, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 
493, 498 (2001). 
72 See Stipulated General Judgment at 1, 6, Oregon ex rel. Hardy Myers v. Merck & 
Co., No. 08C16426 (Or. Cir. Ct. 2008) [hereinafter Merck Stipulated General Judgment], 
available at http://www.merck.com/newsroom/vioxx/pdf/ag_document.pdf. 
73 See generally Complaint, Moore ex rel. Mississippi v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. 94-
1429 (Miss. Ch. Ct. 1994), available at http://www.library.ucsf.edu/sites/all/files/ucsf 
_assets/ms_complaint.pdf. 
74 See id. ¶ 2. 
75 See id. ¶¶ 43–47. 
76 Id. ¶ 65. 
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public nuisance laws.77  He summarized the public nuisance 
allegation as follows: 
[T]he defendants have intentionally and unreasonably interfered 
with the public’s right to be free from unwarranted injury, disease 
and sickness, and have caused damage to the public health, the 
public safety and the general welfare of the citizens of Mississippi, 
and have thereby wrongfully caused the State to expend millions of 
dollars in support of the public health and welfare.78 
Millions in expenses accrued mostly in the form of disbursements 
through Medicaid for the treatment of smoking-related, if not caused, 
diseases.79  Strategically, Moore intentionally brought claims for state 
law violations to avoid the pitfalls that had prevented numerous 
private litigants from recovering against the tobacco industry—the 
primary pitfalls being unsuccessful efforts of either proving causation 
of any illnesses or overcoming the affirmative legal defense of 
assumption of the risk employed by the manufacturers.80 
The major tobacco products manufacturers in the United States 
signed an agreement with Mississippi and the forty-five other state 
attorneys general, who joined the lawsuit against the companies to 
recover for the public harm that resulted from the companies’ 
fraudulent concealment of the dangers involved with smoking.81  This 
settlement agreement forced the tobacco companies to pay an 
extremely large sum of money to the aggrieved parties.82  
Specifically, in exchange for a bar on the states pursuing subsequent 
Medicaid claims in the future against the companies, the defendants 
have had to pay $206 billion over a twenty-five-year span.83 
More importantly, the settlement also required the major tobacco 
companies to substantively reform their practices.84  These reforms 
 
77 Id. ¶¶ 76, 90. 
78 Id. ¶ 90. 
79 Victor E. Schwartz et al., Tort Reform Past, Present and Future: Solving Old 
Problems and Dealing with “New Style” Litigation, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 237, 255–
56 (2000). 
80 Gifford, supra note 67, at 922. 
81 Michael I. Krauss, Regulation Masquerading as Judgment: Chaos Masquerading as 
Tort Law, 71 MISS. L.J. 631, 656–57 (2001) (arguing the lack of foundation for the 
government’s case). 
82 Hensler, supra note 71, at 493. 
83 Robert A. Levy, The New Business of Government Sponsored Litigation, 9 KAN. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 592, 593 (2000). 
84 See NAT’L ASS’N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 14–28, 
available at http://www.naag.org/backpages/naag/tobacco/msa/msa-pdf/MSA with Sig 
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include the following: a prohibition on targeting children in the 
advertising of tobacco products, including a prohibition on the use of 
cartoons in advertising;85 limitations on the ability of the tobacco 
companies to sponsor certain events using the companies’ brand 
names, including most athletic events;86 a ban on merchandise with 
the companies’ brand names;87 and a requirement that the companies 
not sell cigarettes in a pack containing less than twenty.88  
Antismoking advocates had tried for years to obtain similar restraints 
on the tobacco industry from Congress, to no avail, presumably due to 
lobbying efforts.89 
The actions of the state attorneys general against the tobacco 
industry have served as the model and impetus for subsequent 
regulatory lawsuits against other industries.90  Shortly after the 
tobacco settlement, fifty state attorneys general participated in a 
strategy session to discuss future industries to target and reform.91  
“Reports suggest that these targets could include HMOs, automobiles, 
chemicals, alcoholic beverages, pharmaceuticals, Internet providers, 
‘Hollywood,’ video game makers, and even the dairy and fast food 
industries.”92 
B.  State Attorneys General Tackle Prescription Drugs 
The various state attorneys general have displayed an interest in 
testing the outer bounds of their “regulatory” ability in various 
domestic industries through the use of a litany of substantive laws, 
particularly in the pharmaceutical field.93  For example, in 2001, the 
 
Pages and Exhibits.pdf/download (describing the restrictions on defendants’ behavior 
agreed to as part of the settlement). 
85 Id. at 14. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 18–19. 
88 Id. at 21 (providing that this packaging requirement would only be effective until 
December 31, 2001). 
89 Hensler, supra note 71, at 493. 
90 See Sherman Joyce & Michael Hotra, Mississippi’s Civil Justice System: Problems, 
Opportunities and Some Suggested Repairs, 71 MISS. L.J. 395, 411–13 (2001). 
91 Id. at 412. 
92 Schwartz et al., supra note 79, at 258 (emphasis added). 
93 See, e.g., Office of the Comptroller of the Currency v. Spitzer, 396 F. Supp. 2d 383, 
407 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (preempting the New York Attorney General from enforcing state 
fair-lending laws against national banks).  In 2006, the California Attorney General sued 
automobile makers using various tort laws with the goal of regulating automobile 
emissions.  Gifford, supra note 67, at 914–15. 
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West Virginia Attorney General filed suit against the pharmaceutical 
company that manufactured the prescription drug OxyContin alleging 
both violations of the West Virginia Consumer Credit Protection Act 
and various common law torts.94  The attorney general alleged that 
the manufacturer of the drug made various misrepresentations 
concerning the drug’s uses and safety, especially in reference to the 
occurrence of addiction at various dosages of the drug.95  The 
deception allegedly led to an increasing number of people becoming 
addicted to OxyContin, which in turn led to a significant injury to the 
state in the form of a marked increase in social problems, including 
crimes.96  These social problems included “drug abuse and criminal 
acts to obtain OxyContin.”97  The West Virginia Attorney General 
eventually settled the claim with the manufacturer for ten million 
dollars.98 
A decade before the OxyContin settlement, approximately twenty 
states created an informal consumer protection work group to pursue 
various consumer protection law enforcement actions involving 
healthcare issues.99  As shown by the OxyContin suit, this group 
placed, and still pursues, a heavy emphasis on the oversight of 
prescription drugs after their approval in the absence of effective 
supervision by the FDA. 
The state attorneys general use consumer protection laws to fill the 
federal supervisory void by enforcing provisions of the FDCA and 
other FDA regulations.100  The enforcement and regulatory scheme 
employed by the state attorneys general is a direct descendant of the 
tobacco regulation lawsuits.  While this undertaking is certainly 
controversial and vulnerable to challenge, it serves to hold 
pharmaceutical companies accountable for overlooked violations of 
 
94 See Complaint at 12–30, West Virginia ex rel. McGraw v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 
01-C-137-S (W. Va. Cir. Ct. 2001), available at http://www.cmht.com/pdfs/oxycontin       
-cmpl.pdf. 
95 Id. at 2. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 OxyContin Lawsuit Is Settled: Purdue Pharma to Pay State $10 Million, 
CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Nov. 6, 2004, at 1A. 
99 David Woodward, Recent Multistate Enforcement Initiatives: Prescription Drug 
Promotional Practices, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 295, 295, 295 n.1 (1995). 
100 See, e.g., Stipulated General Judgment at 4–14, Oregon ex rel. Hardy Myers v. 
Pfizer, Inc., No. 08C23533 (Or. Cir. Ct. Oct. 22, 2008) [hereinafter Pfizer Stipulated 
General Judgment], available at http://www.doj.state.or.us/releases/pdf/pfizer_stip_judg 
_complaint.pdf. 
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federal law.  This scheme, as discussed below, enables the state 
attorneys general to take an active role in the postapproval regulation 
of prescription drugs. 
The key component of the scheme is regulatory-type settlements.  
When the state attorneys general believe or get the sense that the 
FDCA is not sufficiently protecting consumers in the pharmaceutical 
industry, they subtly supplement the law with substantive terms 
included in settlements that resolve consumer protection actions 
brought by multiple states acting jointly.  The impetus for 
supplementing federal law stems from the tobacco regulation 
litigation, as demonstrated by the various prohibitions on advertising 
included in the settlement between the companies and the state 
attorneys general, especially those involving advertising aimed at 
youth.101  Some proponents of the new regulations created in the 
tobacco settlements believed “[t]he tobacco industry’s influence over 
federal and state legislators makes it enormously difficult, if not 
impossible, for effective tobacco control legislation to be passed at 
the federal or state level.”102  The state attorneys general managed to 
circumvent the influence of the pharmaceutical industry by imposing 
needed reform on the industry. 
For example, the New York Attorney General filed suit against 
Glaxo in 2004, alleging the pharmaceutical company failed to reveal 
important clinical trial results evaluating off-label uses of its approved 
drug Paxil.103  New York argued that Glaxo threatened public health 
by withholding information about off-label uses—an allegation that 
arguably cannot be squared with Glaxo’s obligations under FDA 
regulations, which prohibit pharmaceutical companies from 
discussing off-label aspects of an approved drug.104  The rationale for 
the FDA’s policy restricting such communication stems from the 
agency’s goal of preventing patients from spending more money than 
necessary on medication for its off-label uses, therefore experiencing 
 
101 In fact, the tobacco industry was subjected to heavy scrutiny by Congress, yet the 
legislative body decided not to pass such strict regulations on advertising.  See Gifford, 
supra note 67, at 924. 
102 Graham E. Kelder, Jr. & Richard A. Daynard, The Role of Litigation in the Effective 
Control of the Sale and Use of Tobacco, 8 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 63, 63 (1997). 
103 Hall & Sobotka, supra note 33, at 2.  A prescription drug’s off-label purposes are 
uses made of the drug by the general public that have not been approved by the FDA.  
Complaint at 3, Oregon ex rel. Hardy Myers v. Pfizer, Inc., Case No. 08C23533 (Or. Cir. 
Ct. Oct. 22, 2008) [hereinafter Pfizer Complaint], available at http://www.doj.state.or.us/ 
releases/pdf/pfizer_complaint.pdf. 
104 Hall & Sobotka, supra note 33, at 2. 
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harmful side effects from unevaluated uses of the drugs and even 
potentially dying from a misuse of the drug.105  Glaxo eventually 
settled with the New York Attorney General and agreed to release all 
of the clinical trial information about Paxil, including information 
about the off-label uses.106  The state attorney general was obviously 
convinced that the FDA regulations were insufficient to protect the 
citizens of New York and, in a subtle way, circumvented the agency’s 
authority by creating new substantive obligations for Glaxo in the 
future.107  The strategy of procuring settlement with pharmaceutical 
companies to fill the void left by a lack of FDA regulation had proved 
to be a viable way to ensure the company’s actions were being 
sufficiently monitored. 
C.  Recent Enforcement Actions: The Vioxx Settlement 
The strategy discussed above has been utilized in recent years to 
further a variety of enforcement and regulation interests of state 
attorneys general, normally under the leadership of the Oregon 
Attorney General.  In May 2008, Merck & Co., Inc., (Merck) entered 
into a stipulated general judgment with a coalition of twenty-nine 
states and the District of Columbia concerning the prescription drug 
Vioxx.108  The Oregon-led coalition alleged that Merck violated their 
respective state consumer protection statutes through a deceptive 
advertising campaign that misrepresented Vioxx’s cardiovascular 
safety while the drug was on the market.109  On September 30, 2004, 
after a Data and Safety Monitoring Board for a Merck-sponsored 
clinical trial of Vioxx found that subjects had an increased risk of 
serious cardiovascular ailments as compared to subjects taking a 
placebo, Merck voluntarily withdrew the pain drug from the 
market.110  As discussed above, the FDA found the safety evidence 
 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 3. 
107 For an interesting analysis of the constitutionality of the FDA’s limitations for off-
label advertising and a discussion of the implications of these limits for First Amendment 
jurisprudence, see id. at 3, 10–48. 
108 See Merck Stipulated General Judgment, supra note 72, at 3. 
109 Press Release, Attorney Gen. of Mass., Attorney General Martha Coakley Files 
Judgment Against Merck Pharmaceutical for the Company’s Deceptive Marketing of 
Vioxx (May 20, 2008), available at http://www.mass.gov/?pageID=cagopressrelease&L 
=1&L0=Home&sid=Cago&b=pressrelease&f=2008_05_20_vioxx_judgment&csid=Cago. 
110 U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Merck Withdraws Vioxx; FDA Issues Public Health 
Advisory, FDA CONSUMER, Nov.–Dec. 2004, available at http://findarticles.com/p/ 
articles/mi_m1370/is_6_38/ai_n7069493/. 
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from various clinical trials prior to Merck’s voluntary withdrawal 
inconclusive.111 
Merck’s settlement with the state attorneys general is significant 
for both the monetary and substantive terms it contained.  The 
coalition of state attorneys general received a $58 million monetary 
settlement that was to be divided among the thirty members.112  At 
the time, the payment was the largest financial settlement for 
consumer protection violations based on deceptive advertising of a 
prescription drug.113  But the more material aspect of the settlement is 
the substantive terms used by the coalition to “[position] themselves 
as potent enforcers in their own right who have the will and the means 
. . . to impose significant going-forward constraints on the 
pharmaceutical and device industries.”114  It is important to note at 
the outset that the settlement terms apply prospectively to all of 
Merck’s drugs as opposed to only drugs in a certain class, e.g., pain 
relievers.  The substantive terms can be broken down into two 
somewhat distinct categories: increased ability for state attorneys 
general to enforce FDA regulations and new regulations of Merck’s 
activities by which the company voluntarily agreed to abide. 
The Merck settlement increases the ability of the state attorneys 
general to enforce regulations promulgated by the FDA.115  The 
settlement requires Merck to refrain from any advertising concerning 
the safety or efficacy of any FDA-approved drug that violates the 
FDCA and other FDA regulations.116  In accordance with the FDA 
Amendments Act of 2007, Merck must also submit information 
regarding clinical trial results to a registry established by the FDA.117  
But, the settlement expressly states that it is not requiring Merck to 
violate the FDCA and the FDA’s other regulations nor is it requiring 
Merck to fail to act as mandated by the FDCA and the FDA.118  
Basically, the terms merely require Merck to abide by federal laws.  
 
111 See supra notes 12–16 and accompanying text. 
112 MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY, supra note 66, at 2. 
113 Press Release, Penn. Office of the Attorney Gen., Attorney General Corbett 
Announces a Multi-State, $58 Million Settlement with Merck over Deceptive Advertising 
Concerning the Safety of Vioxx (May 20, 2008), available at http://www.attorney 
general.gov/press.aspx?id=3660. 
114 MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY, supra note 66, at 2. 
115 Id. at 2–3. 
116 Merck Stipulated General Judgment, supra note 72, at 5. 
117 Id. at 4–5. 
118 Id. at 5–6. 
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Also for future validity, an important notion that emerges from these 
provisions in the settlement is the fact that “even though the 
settlement agreement was effected under the various state consumer 
protection statutes, [the agreement] largely sidesteps the entire 
preemption controversy.”119  Through the aforementioned settlement 
terms, the state attorneys general seem to have effectively put 
themselves in the FDA’s enforcement realm.120  Any terms in the 
settlement that Merck violates can be directly enforced through a 
contempt proceeding in court because the settlement is contractually 
enforceable by the state attorneys general.121 
The settlement also imposes new regulatory obligations on Merck 
that do not stem from federal law or regulations.  As of this writing, 
pharmaceutical companies are under no obligation to submit their 
direct-to-consumer (DTC) advertising to the FDA prior to running the 
advertisement in any media.122  The argument against requiring the 
companies to make such a submission revolves around a concern that 
the terms are unconstitutional under the First Amendment.123  But, in 
the settlement, Merck voluntarily agreed to “submit all new DTC 
television advertising campaigns for any Merck Product to FDA for 
pre-review, wait until Merck receives a response from FDA prior to 
running the advertising campaign, and to modify such advertising 
consistent with any written comments received from FDA.”124  Based 
on Merck’s volition, the settlement likely avoids the First Amendment 
issues that prevent the imposition of federal regulations for DTC 
advertising, while also creating a type of “pocket veto” for the FDA 
regarding any new television advertising campaigns for Merck 
products.125 
 
119 MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY, supra note 66, at 3; see also Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. 
Ct. 1187, 1200 (2009) (finding that the FDCA does not preempt a claim for lack of 
adequate warning under state law).  The settlement seems to provide the state attorneys 
general with an important enforcement role regardless of any future court decisions or 
legislation preempting the regulation of prescription drugs through state tort law claims.  
The state attorneys general need only rely on state contract law. 
120 Merck Stipulated General Judgment, supra note 72, at 2. 
121 Id. at 3.  It is worth noting the practical difficulties of bringing a contempt 
proceeding based on a violation of the settlement by Merck.  Whether a trial court judge in 
a particular state—likely Oregon—could effectively handle such a proceeding is difficult 
to ascertain based on the strong interest of the FDA in any precedent that emerges from a 
decision regarding whether a company has violated its regulations. 
122 See 21 U.S.C. § 352(n)(3)(a) (2006). 
123 MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY, supra note 66, at 4. 
124 Merck Stipulated General Judgment, supra note 72, at 6 (emphasis added). 
125 See MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY, supra note 66, at 4. 
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The state attorneys general also included other regulatory 
provisions in the settlement.  One such provision imposes more 
stringent disclosure requirements for Continuing Medical Education 
(CME) presenters who may have a financial conflict of interest 
arising from a promotional relationship with Merck, including a 
requirement of a written disclosure of the conflict in the materials 
provided at the CME session.126  These requirements were likely 
intended to flush out any prejudices that attendees should be made 
aware.  Further, the settlement outlines the requirements that must be 
met for an individual to be identified as an author in a manuscript for 
a Merck-sponsored clinical trial.127  A proposed author must have 
“made substantial contribution to the conception and design, or 
acquisition of data, or analysis and interpretation of data.”128  This 
requirement reflects the concern of the state attorneys general with the 
rampant exercise of “ghostwriting.”129  Ghostwriting refers to the 
practice in the pharmaceutical industry of writing manuscripts within 
the company and paying prominent scientists to be listed as authors 
when the manuscripts are published in scientific journals.130  
Documents uncovered as a result of Vioxx lawsuits showed Merck 
was actively ghostwriting.131  The settlement also imposes new 
constraints on Merck concerning the use of scientists with certain 
financial conflicts of interest on a Data Safety and Monitoring Board 
for a Merck-sponsored clinical trial.132  Once again, these constraints 
are intended to increase the objectivity of those controlling the results 
and completion of clinical trials. 
As discussed in the tobacco context above, Merck was likely under 
intense financial and public relations pressure during the investigation 
by the state attorneys general, which led to a settlement with such 
wide-ranging and potentially damaging requirements regarding future 
practices. 
 
126 Merck Stipulated General Judgment, supra note 72, at 8. 
127 Id. at 10. 
128 Id. 
129 MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY, supra note 66, at 6. 
130 Jonathan Bor, Research Ghostwriting Common, Insiders Say: Drug Companies Seek 
Recognized Authors, BALT. SUN, Apr. 18, 2008, at 1A, available at http://articles 
.baltimoresun.com/2008-04-18/news/0804180351_1_deangelis-merck-ghost writing. 
131 See id.  Bor also provides insights from insiders in the clinical trial arena that 
suggest ghostwriting is a widespread practice throughout the pharmaceutical industry.  Id. 
132 Merck Stipulated General Judgment, supra note 72, at 9. 
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D.  More Comprehensive Regulation: The Bextra Settlement 
Shortly after the Merck settlement, pharmaceutical giant Pfizer 
faced similar financial and public relations pressure as the result of an 
investigation of its prescription drug Bextra.  The FDA approved 
Bextra on November 16, 2001, for the relief of symptoms of various 
types of arthritis and menstrual pain.133  Pfizer did not receive 
approval from the FDA for other indications it had proposed and 
actively sought, namely the treatment of general acute pain.134  The 
FDA explicitly found the data submitted concerning the efficacy and 
safety of Bextra for the treatment of acute pain to be insufficient to 
warrant approval of the drug for that purpose.135 
A coalition of state attorneys general brought an action against 
Pfizer for violating state consumer protection laws based on the 
deceptive promotion of Bextra for “off-label” purposes.136  In direct 
conflict with the FDA’s decision not to approve Bextra for the 
treatment of general acute pain, Pfizer allegedly promoted the drug 
for this off-label use through various means, including the following: 
distributing samples of Bextra to specialty physicians who do not 
normally treat patients suffering from arthritis or menstrual pain, 
which was the approved population for the drug; providing various 
gifts, mostly meals, to doctors who prescribed the drug to patients for 
off-label purposes; delivering print advertisements to physicians and 
consumers that highlighted Bextra’s efficacy for off-label uses; and 
promulgating  a substantial number of copies of studies showing 
positive results for the drug’s treatment of acute pain without 
juxtaposing those studies with the numerous negative studies 
evaluating Bextra’s off-label uses.137  This off-label advertising not 
only violated state consumer protection laws, it also violated federal 
regulations promulgated by the FDA.138  In April 2005, the FDA 
asked Pfizer to voluntarily withdraw Bextra from the market based on 
safety concerns that were similar to those revealed in the use of 
 
133 Letter from Jonca Bull, Acting Dir., Office of Drug Evaluation, U.S. Food & Drug 
Admin., to Peter L. East, Assoc. Dir. of Regulatory Affairs, G.D. Searle & Co., at 1 (Nov. 
16, 2001), available at  http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/nda/2001/21-341 
_Bextra_Approv.pdf. 
134 Id.; see also Pfizer Complaint, supra note 103, at 2–3. 
135 Letter from Jonca Bull, supra note 133, at 3. 
136 Pfizer Complaint, supra note 103, at 18–21. 
137 Id. at 3–4. 
138 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(4) (2009). 
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Vioxx—a drug in the same class as Bextra.139  The FDA, however, 
never investigated the off-label advertising violations of Bextra, even 
though they were allegedly widespread. 
Undaunted, state attorneys general took the initiative to investigate 
these violations and brought suit under their respective consumer 
protection laws.  Eventually a coalition of thirty-two states and the 
District of Columbia entered into a settlement with Pfizer that 
imposed terms similar to the Merck settlement.140  The states added 
an interesting twist to the new settlement’s terms that seemed to 
address a perceived difficulty with enforcing the Merck settlement.  
Although the Merck settlement contains important obligations on the 
part of the company, the state attorneys general have few resources to 
devote to the monitoring of Merck’s compliance, especially in the 
current economic climate.  Most states certainly have the ability to 
subpoena information from the company at any time to obtain 
information and communications relating to potential violations.141  
Yet the states would likely need some sort of “tip” or other indication 
that such unlawful conduct was occurring to know what documents to 
subpoena and when to make the request. 
To account for this difficulty in enforcing the terms of the Pfizer 
settlement, which arguably created new regulations to which Pfizer 
must adhere, the state attorneys general inserted self-reporting 
mechanisms in the agreement.  For example, the Pfizer settlement 
contains a provision requiring the company to submit any DTC 
television campaign to the FDA for review and to modify the 
campaign in accordance with the FDA’s recommendations prior to 
running it.142  Unlike the Merck settlement, Pfizer may run an 
 
139 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., ALERT FOR HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONALS: 
VALDECOXIB (MARKETED AS BEXTRA) (Apr. 7, 2005), available at http://www.fda.gov/ 
Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatientsandProviders/ucm124649.
htm (concluding “the overall risk versus benefit profile of Bextra is unfavorable”); see also 
supra note 110 and accompanying text.  In all fairness to Pfizer, the company decided to 
heed the FDA’s advice and removed the product from the market despite voicing 
disagreement with the FDA’s decision. 
140 Pfizer Stipulated General Judgment, supra note 100, at 3–14.  The states were: 
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, 
New York, New Mexico, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Washington, 
and Wisconsin.  Id. 
141 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 646.618(1) (2009). 
142 Pfizer Stipulated General Judgment, supra note 100, at 6.  Similar terms were used 
in the Merck settlement.  See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
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advertisement after waiting a reasonable time—forty-five days—
without receiving the FDA’s response, but the company must provide 
written notice to a smaller executive group of signatory states to alert 
the state coalition that the FDA did not provide any of the requested 
guidance.143  Pfizer would also have to include any material 
submitted to the FDA concerning the request for a review of the 
proposed advertising with the notice.144 
While states may face similar resource limitations in monitoring 
Pfizer’s compliance with this notice requirement, the settlement 
establishes an affirmative duty on the part of the company to, in 
essence, alert the state attorneys general of a potential violation of the 
settlement terms.  At a minimum, the state attorneys general could 
begin focusing heightened attention and effort on investigating the 
compliance of Pfizer’s advertising efforts after receiving this alert.  
The notice requirement demonstrates another step by the states to fill 
the perceived gap in the FDA’s enforcement efforts.  Basically, the 
two governmental bodies are receiving similar information, but the 
states are more capable and motivated to enforce regulations, 
especially with the potential financial and publicity benefits that 
inherently result from efforts to keep the citizens of the states safe. 
E.  Obstacles for Regulatory Settlements 
The settlements between Merck and Pfizer and the state attorneys 
general were motivated by a general lack of belief that the FDA can, 
or will, effectively ensure a satisfactory level of safety in the 
pharmaceutical industry.  In fact, some commentators have asserted 
that the fact that “State AGs, individually and collectively, can now 
march into court under [the] FDA’s own regulations effectively 
means that there is a ‘new cop on the beat’ ready, willing and able to 
pursue actions for alleged advertising violations whenever they 
believe [the] FDA is not doing the job properly.”145 
As discussed above, the avenue of choice for state attorneys 
general to regulate the pharmaceutical companies is claims under 
their respective consumer protection statutes.  There is a strong 
argument that these consumer protection laws were originally enacted 
by states to fill a gap in product safety areas where industry is not 
 
143 Pfizer Stipulated General Judgment, supra note 100, at 6. 
144 Id. 
145 MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY, supra note 66, at 5. 
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closely regulated and supervised by the federal government.146  Based 
on the legislative intent behind enacting these statutes, there is an 
inherent tension involved with claims by the state attorneys general 
alleging misleading representations or promotion—as was the case in 
the Merck and Pfizer cases—that arises from the fact that the 
allegedly improper conduct is not only regulated but also authorized 
by the FDA through the NDA process.147  Basically, the FDA 
approved the labeling that the state attorneys general subsequently 
found insufficient.  Opponents to the actions of the state attorneys 
general argue that public policy reasons favor a conformance between 
the states’ enforcement of their consumer protection laws and the 
regulations enforced by the FDA.148  The most persuasive reasons 
include: predictability for pharmaceutical companies that rely on the 
decisions of the FDA, uniformity between federal and state regulatory 
actions, and a general deference to the ability and authority of federal 
agencies involved in regulating prescription drugs.149  Settlements 
under consumer protection laws could also be found to be preempted 
by federal law in the future, though this potential avenue may have 
been recently foreclosed.150 
Enhancing the FDA’s ability to regulate prescription drugs after 
approval would serve to both restore the confidence of the state 
attorneys general in federal regulatory endeavors and simultaneously 
satisfy the important public policy concerns voiced by opponents to 
the state efforts. 
III 
A MORE TRUSTWORTHY AND EFFECTIVE FDA 
For the FDA to truly perform effectively and decrease the 
regulatory void filled by the enforcement actions of the state attorneys 
general, important changes to the structure of the agency must be 
implemented.  The FDA needs to be able to make educated decisions 
based on a more accurate accumulation of information detailing 
 
146 See Victor E. Schwartz et al., “That’s Unfair!” Says Who—The Government or the 
Litigant?: Consumer Protection Claims Involving Regulated Conduct, 47 WASHBURN L.J. 
93, 119 (2007). 
147 Id. at 94. 
148 See id. at 99. 
149 See id. at 94. 
150 Preemption issues involving these settlements were likely avoided due to the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009). 
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developing safety concerns with a particular drug.  The decision-
making responsibility within the FDA must be vested in the Office of 
Surveillance and Epidemiology, as opposed to the current system in 
which the Office of New Drugs makes postapproval decisions.  This 
shift in responsibility will allow a single office within the FDA to 
focus solely on the postapproval regulation of drugs.  That office will 
have both access to safety information and the ability to unilaterally 
make binding regulatory decisions based on that information. 
A.  Increased Specialization Within the FDA 
The section of the FDA that is responsible for the efficacy and 
safety of prescription drugs throughout the drug’s lifetime is the 
Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER).151  Within the 
CDER, two distinct subunits play roles in the postapproval regulation 
of prescription drugs, namely the Office of New Drugs (OND) and 
the Office of Surveillance and Epidemiology (OSE).152  The OND is 
responsible for both approving a particular drug and regulating that 
same drug based on postapproval safety data.153  The OSE primarily 
focuses on the emerging safety data about prescription drugs by 
monitoring reported adverse events and participating in drug safety 
research outside of the agency.154 
Although the most knowledgeable about postapproval safety based 
on its information-gathering function, the OSE mostly serves as an 
advisory body to the OND.  As the Merck and Eli Lilly examples 
demonstrated above155, even a system that fully educates the FDA 
about the safety profile of a drug may be subject to inconsistent 
interpretations within the agency.  For this reason and others, the 
decision-making responsibility following analysis of postapproval 
safety data must be vested in a subunit of the FDA that is only 
concerned with postapproval regulation.  This office must be separate 
from its counterpart that is responsible for approving the drug for 
introduction into the market. 
 
151 U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FAQs About CDER, http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/ 
CentersOffices/CDER/FAQsaboutCDER/default.htm#1 (last visited Mar. 17, 2010). 
152 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 54, at 4.  The careful reader will 
notice that the report by the GAO refers to an Office of Drug Safety.  Shortly after the 
GAO’s report, the Office of Drug Safety was renamed the Office of Surveillance and 
Epidemiology. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at 4–5. 
155 See supra notes 11–16, 22–26 and accompanying text. 
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Although the OND works closely with the OSE, the vesting of 
decision-making authority regarding postapproval regulation in the 
former presents significant difficulties.  These problems include a 
lack of communication between the two offices concerning the final 
decisions made by the OND.156  Frequently, the OSE does not even 
know what decision the OND has reached.  In addition to the issues 
arising from the communication between these offices, there is an 
inherent conflict of interest that develops from vesting postapproval 
decision-making responsibility in the OND.157  Requiring the office 
that initially approved the prescription drug to essentially discredit its 
own approval decision by actively trying to find safety and efficacy 
deficiencies almost necessarily creates an environment for substantial 
harmful biases.158  This situation may have unwittingly played a role 
in the understating of the risks of Vioxx discussed above. 
B.  A New Office of Postmarket Drug Evaluation 
The federal government can eliminate these issues and, thus, more 
effectively regulate prescription drugs in the marketplace by 
transforming the OSE into a pseudo-separate agency with the ability 
to make postapproval regulatory decisions and enforce those 
decisions.  The OSE, or a comparable subunit within the FDA, could 
serve as a continuous “third-party” decision reviewer of the OND’s 
decision to approve a drug.  This constant review would presumably 
be void of any conflict of interest, as the office, unlike the OND, 
would have no desire to “save face.” 
This proposal is comparable to the failed Food and Drug 
Administration Act of 2005 (FDAA) that was chiefly sponsored by 
Senator Charles Grassley.159  This bill sought to establish the “Center 
for Post-Market Drug Evaluation and Research” (Center) within the 
FDA as solely responsible for the effectiveness and safety of drugs in 
the marketplace.160  To fulfill the new Center’s primary 
responsibility, the FDAA obligated the Director of the Center to 
 
156 Id. at 5. 
157 See Fontanarosa et al., supra note 3, at 2647. 
158 See id. 
159 AM. SOC’Y OF HEALTH-SYSTEM PHARMACISTS, THE FOOD AND DRUG 
ADMINISTRATION SAFETY ACT OF 2005—SUMMARY 2005, http://www.ashp.org/s_ashp/ 
docs/files/GAD_GrassleyDodd_FDASASummary2.pdf.  The bill never passed the 
committee review stage of the legislative process in the Senate during the 109th Session of 
Congress.  Id. 
160 Id. 
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conduct postapproval surveillance of drugs and “take corrective 
action if a drug or biological product presents an unreasonable risk to 
patients or the general public.”161 
To transform the powers and responsibilities of the OSE, a bill 
similar to the FDAA should be sponsored in the next legislative 
session with a few modifications.  The FDAA gave the discretion to 
enforce postapproval regulations to the Secretary of the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services through the availability of 
civil penalties for violations.162  But this power is more appropriately 
placed in the hands of the newly proposed division charged with 
determining if additional regulation is even necessary.  The 
effectiveness of new regulations and decisions regarding current 
regulations would likely depend on the ability of the new division to 
impose penalties for violations and, therefore, create proper 
guidelines for pharmaceutical companies to operate under. 
In the context of Phase IV trials, this new division should be 
charged with the duty of requesting and ensuring that the 
pharmaceutical company sponsoring an NDA completes an 
appropriate Phase IV trial.163  This division could overcome the 
“institutional risk-aversion that pervades the FDA” and create policies 
for conducting Phase IV trials that are clearly articulated to 
sponsors.164  The new division should have the capability to enforce 
any Phase IV mandatory “requests,” through civil penalties or other 
actions, using federal law. 
To remove some amount of discretion and uncertainty involved 
with Phase IV trial requests, Congress should consider making Phase 
IV studies uniformly mandatory for all prescription drugs that are 
approved, as recommended by various experts.165  In fact, there have 
been recent efforts by legislators to pass laws empowering the FDA to 
demand postapproval investigations concerning substantial safety 
problems revealed by MedWatch, the system through which the FDA 
 
161 Id.  The Act also gave the Director of the Center the duties of determining when a 
postmarket study should be required; requiring the sponsor of such a drug or product to 
contract with domestic and international surveillance databases to perform any 
observational studies; determining whether a drug or product presents a serious risk to the 
health of the public; and providing timely information about safety and efficacy drugs and 
biological products to the public and health care providers.  Id. 
162 Id. 
163 This power is generally given to the Center by sections 2 and 3 of the failed Food 
and Drug Administration Safety Act of 2005. 
164 Steenburg, supra note 34, at 327. 
165 See, e.g., Fontanarosa et al., supra note 3, at 2649–50. 
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gathers adverse event information, or other sources that monitor a 
drug’s use.166  These efforts seek to codify and strengthen the current 
system in which the FDA conditions drug approval on the 
“agreement” of the sponsor to conduct Phase IV trials.167   
For example, the recently enacted FDA Amendments Act adds to 
the ability of the FDA to utilize Phase IV trials.  The FDA 
Amendments Act allows the FDA to compel sponsoring companies to 
conduct Phase IV trials as a condition of approval.168  The Act also 
gives the FDA the power to require postapproval Phase IV trials if 
safety information shows a new safety risk is emerging from the 
drug’s usage by the general public.169  But in practice, once approval 
of the various drugs has occurred, the pharmaceutical companies 
routinely fail to fulfill their Phase IV trial promises.170  The new 
division should be empowered to levy the appropriate civil penalties 
on a company that is not following the division’s commands to 
perform Phase IV trials.  This would enable a specific division of the 
FDA to monitor and accurately ensure a company’s compliance with 
Phase IV study requests. 
There is certainly a concern that emerges from this new division’s 
solitary discretion, which could be overwhelmed by the lobbying 
efforts of the pharmaceutical industry.  Merely empowering the new 
division to compel Phase IV studies would likely continue the 
perpetuation of uncertainty on the part of pharmaceutical 
companies—which will not be able to predict what amount of 
resources to budget for Phase IV trials.171  But, the responsive 
concern is the great deal of confusion currently resulting from FDA 
reviewers who admit they are often “unsure what types of 
[postapproval] commitments to request of sponsors.”172  This issue 
could be cured by creating an official policy within the new division 
that sets a minimum or floor for postapproval studies based on the 
 
166 Affordable Health Care Act, S. 16, 109th Cong. § 507(a) (2005).  
167 Steenburg, supra note 34, at 333.  The FDA arguably possesses unreviewable 
discretion in approving prescription drugs to be placed on the market, and thus, 
pharmaceutical companies may have no recourse for the FDA’s “requirement” of a Phase 
IV trial.  Id. at 334. 
168 Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 32, at 490. 
169 Id. at 491. 
170 Steenburg, supra note 34, at 337. 
171 See id. at 341. 
172 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FDA’S 
REVIEW PROCESS FOR NEW DRUG APPLICATIONS: A MANAGEMENT REVIEW 19 (2003), 
available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-01-01-00590.pdf. 
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class of the prescription drug.  The level of mandatory postapproval 
scrutiny would be calculated relative to the potential safety issues 
involved with each class of drugs and the likely users in the class, if 
such a population can be determined.  For example, sponsors of anti-
inflammatory drugs could expect to, at a minimum, conduct a three-
year Phase IV study of the safety and efficacy of the drugs when used 
by juveniles.  The new proposed division could then raise the level of 
scrutiny needed based on the novelty of the class—a class of drugs 
that have been used by the public for decades would receive less 
scrutiny than a brand-new class.173 
With these powers, the new division would not experience the 
disabling disconnection currently encountered between the decision 
making of the OND and the suggestions of the OSE.174  Further, this 
delegation of enforcement power would create a pseudo-agency 
within the FDA with similar powers to the state attorneys general, 
thereby creating a nationwide “watchdog” for postapproval 
prescription drugs.  With a nationwide enforcer of the FDCA, the 
state attorneys general will likely not have to continue to perform a 
substantial regulatory gap-filling function.  The American public 
would have an invigorated faith in the safety of the pharmaceutical 
products they use everyday. 
CONCLUSION 
The American public’s confidence in the FDA is waning in the 
midst of increased reporting of inefficiencies in the agency.  The 
missteps by the FDA in the postapproval regulation of prescription 
drugs are magnified by the pervasive use of prescription drugs in the 
market.  State attorneys general have responded to the public’s lack of 
confidence by bringing suit against pharmaceutical companies under 
state consumer protection laws.  In protecting their citizens, the state 
 
173 There may be an issue with the discretion to raise or lower the minimum 
postapproval study that would be mandatory for a class.  Although the new division within 
the FDA would be able to change the minimum based on the longevity of the class of 
drugs, adequate notice will have to be given to the pharmaceutical industry to allow for the 
adjustment of budgeted resources. 
174 There is certainly a valid argument that the separation of regulatory and enforcement 
powers between the FDA and the Department of Health and Human Services is necessary 
to add a layer of oversight to the entire process.  However, this concern does not outweigh 
the interest in efficiency and reliability in the proposed regulatory scheme.  The new 
agency will have the greatest understanding of the imposed regulation on the 
pharmaceutical company and thus should be empowered to enforce compliance with the 
agency’s decision. 
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attorneys general have begun to institute new regulations in the 
prescription drug industry through the use of innovative settlement 
terms.  The state attorneys general have also used these settlement 
agreements to take a more active role filling the void created by an 
inefficient FDA. 
But there are many difficulties that arise from a system in which 
two different enforcers are monitoring and enforcing a pharmaceutical 
company’s compliance with federal law.  Not the least of these 
problems is the likely overlap of penalties and inconsistent 
interpretations of the federal regulations by the two bodies. 
To overcome these difficulties, the FDA should reorganize itself 
and push Congress for greater enforcement capabilities.  The agency 
should vest the responsibility for monitoring and regulating 
prescription drugs after their approval to the Office of Surveillance 
and Epidemiology, or a newly created division.  To ensure the new 
division can restore public trust in postapproval regulation of 
prescription drugs, Congress should enact legislation that allows it to 
effectively regulate through the use of civil fines and criminal 
prosecution against companies that refuse to follow its orders. 
With this new division in place, the American public will be able to 
trust the FDA to accurately and neutrally evaluate both the safety and 
efficacy of prescription drugs even after the drugs have been 
approved for sale, and public faith in the agency will be restored. 
